THE MYTH OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE
Avid readers of the business press noted a new fad anlong hot companies late in the 1990s -the restatement of earnings. Formal earnings restatements to the SEC had. by a cvnservative count. averaged 49 a year between 1990 and 1997. hut they rose sharply to 91 In t998. 150 in 1999, and 156 in 2000 (FEI. 2001 ) . Jn discussing the fad, the business press cited increased regulatory oversi~ht -in Jnly 2001, halr a year before Enron declared bankruptcy. the Wall Street Jour~lal reported "the number of corporate earnings re5taternents has sk yrvcketed during the past three years, driven in large pan by stepped-up enforcement at the SEC" (Weil, 2001, p. 15) . We now know that earnings restatements were becoming widespread for another reason -execulives were increasingly cooking their books to satisfy securi ties analysts and institutional investors. They massaged profit reports to keep their companies on analysts "buy" lists (although we now also know that analysts scldom recommended anything but "buy" at the turn of the millennium). and to keep inst~tutional investors pumping new pension contributions in their d~rcction.
Corporate mnlfcisance rook a new form in the 1990s. Execut~ves no longer looted company coffers and fled to sunny isles without extradition treaties. They lied about how much money their firms made. This practice was nat new, but the peculiar form i t took was new. They lied to make corporate earnings appear to rise at a constant rate toward an infinite horizon, and to conform to the projections of securities analysts. They cooked the books in both directions, withholding news of exceptional earnings as insurance against a rainy day. Five executives at Freddie Mac, the sernipublic mortgage company, were deposed after f~mously under-reporting earnings by 5 billion dollars between 2 0 0 and 2001.
What produced this change in the nature of executrvr misbehavior? CEOs revolutionized the core business strategy of big firms in the last quarter of the 70th century, shifting from a focus on diversification and expansion to a foclis on "shareholder value." Whereas previous shifts in corporate strategy had come about, depending on whom you listen to, because esisting strategies of increasing returns had run their course or because new managemen1 factions within the firm sold eaecuttves and shareholders on new strategies, this change came about because three groups with new clout in financial markets succeeded in imposing their will on corporations. They redefined corporate efficiency, and realigned the material interests of others.
Those three groups -hostile takeover firms. insti tut tonal investors, and securities analysts -each had their own reasons for selling n new corporate strategy, in which "shareholder value" (defined eventually as the capacity to meel securit ~e s analysts' profit projections) was the holy grail . Those groups succeeded hy articulating the myth of "shareholder value." to replace the myth of corporate "portfolio management" that had supported expnnsionthrough-diversification as the guiding strategy of the large American firm. What redirected executive attention were the new rhetoric of shareholder value and a new compensation strategy. Institutional investors encouraged firms to compensate executives with s~ncl; options, designed to align executive interest with shareholder interest -with the predictable consequencz that executives would fib ahout profits. The big accounting firms enabled th~s fibbing by hawking instruments that made profits appear and disappear, and by lobbying against the account~ng of stock option grants as expenses. Securities analysts were complicit . icrr the financial institutions they worked for had vested interests in seeing firms perform well (Swedberg, 2004) .
We have two points to make. One is that this new corporate strategy was an idea hatched not by corporate executives, as was the case with previous strateges, and not h) shareholders, as mythology suggests, but by professional groups in financial markets. These groups managed to change the incentives that executives faced and thereby to change the behavior of firms. These were not robber barons in cigar-filled rooms. but MBAs and CPAs worhng wittun large financial institutions. The ~dea that the power elite is can~prised of capitalists and captains of lndus~ry now seems antiquatedknowledgr workers who redefined corporate efficiency were the tnit iators and biggest beneficiaries of these changes. The changes produced huge windfalls for hostile t akeovzr specialists, institutional investors, and securities analysts, as well as tor executives. The second point is that while regulatory reforms now make it harder for firms to cook the hooks, the fundamentals of the new system have nor changed. Institutional investors still control large blocks of shares: securitks analysts still project profits; and CEOs are still compensated with stock options. The scandals surrounding Enron and Worldcorn led to regulatory changes. but not changes that would alter how the whole system works. The so-called shareholdervalue model of the firm unamb~guously displaced the growth-by-diversification model, but nothing has yet appeared to replace the shareholder-value model.
Parts of the story werc the result of happenstunce, lo be sure. It was happenstance (the baby boom) that pension investments grew by leaps and bounds and were increasingly put into the stock market, leading instjtutional investcrs to control the majority of stock in major corporations. It was happenstance that the high technology boom would replace the conventional metric of corporate success, profits, with the arms-length metric of meeting analysts' profitfloss projections. But the new shareholder value mode1 of the firm was also the result of professional strategizing by groups that were empowered by these historical shifts, institutional investors in the first place and securities analysts in the second.
FROM GROWTH-BY-ACQUISITION TO BE AT-THE-ANALY STS
The shareholder value strategy is not the first new strategy to sweep Across American firms. For Alfred Chandler ( 1977) , the production+xpansion strategy was supplanted by the sales and marketing strategy, which in turn was supplanted by the diversification strategy. Each change represented a stage in the evolution toward more efficient corporate forms. Each change was initiated by inside managers and was spread through competition among firms. For Nzil Fligstein (19901, these changes canir about because marketii~g specialists, and later financial diversification experts, struggled to win control over f i r m strategy -not beciause they necessarily had superior stra tegles but because they gained executive positions by convincing management and boards to adopt their strategies. Each change represented a new social construction of corporate efficiency. Each change was iniria~ed by insiders and was spread through rhetoric.
The rise of the so-called shareholder value firm wils different. Its propoilents were located outside of firms, arid they succeeded by changing how executives and shareholders perceived their own interests.
From the perspective of the average CEO circa t 975, the best way to get ahead was to "grow the company" through diversifying acquisitions. Most of the money CEOs made came in the form of salary. and the bigger your company, the bigger your salary. There was good evidence that diversifying acquisitions depressed stock price -paradox~cally , they typically increased the stock price of the seller but decreased the stock price of the buyer. If executives were looking to serve shareholders, it stands to reason, they should have tried to sell. Instead, they tried to buy other companies because they understood buying as the path to career advancement. After all, CEOs who sold out were put out to pasture, and CEOs who bought other firms stood atop enlarged empires.
Three groups came along to argue that diversifying acquisitions were inefficient, and that firms should instead focus on maximizing "shareholder value," or stock price. Each of the groups had something to gain if fimls abandoned growth-by-acquisition and embraced beat-the-analysts. The groups succeeded in institutionalizing a new metric of executive performance -beating analysts' profit projections rather than negotiating rancy acquisitions -by convincing executives that the metric was in their interest. They did this by replacing the system of executive compensation, in which salary was a function of firm size, with a system in which CEOs who could beat securities analysts' forecasts saw stock option windfalls.
The old system of executive compensation was harshly criticized by institutional investors and by agency theorists in economics for servine CEOs but not investors. CEOs expanded their corporations for their own benefit. they argued, ignoring the real interest of shareholders, which was to see the price of stock increase. But the system that replaced it was dysfunctiunal in another way; it created an incentive for CEOs to put all of their energy into meeting the profit projections of securities analysts -into earnings management. Institutional investors had lobbied to change CEO compensation, and this meant that CEOs were now granted stock options at a given price, which they could exercise after a certain future date. If the stock options were granted at today's share price, and if they could be exercised a year from today, the race was on to produce strong profit numbers and thereby inffate stock price over the coming year. Another important change contributed to the earnings-management strategy. The high technology boom convinced many lhat simple stock price was a poor measure of the firm value. The companies of the future were operating in the red, but hq being first-movers they were establishing themsehes in their respective markets, or so the story went. Thus, institutional and individual investors increas~ngly looked to analysts' projections of profits and losses, and to whether firms could meel those projections. Amazon was a good value so long as 11 losl no more than the experts expected, and hence stock price increased and fell on a firm's ability to meet analysts' estimates. This is what encouraged not simply earnings exaggerations. but earnings management or the smoothing of corporate profits to match analyst projections. Executives hoping to reap regular rewards hy exercising stock options, and then selling the stock, had to meet a n a l~s t project ions regularly to buoy stock price so that profits from newly exercised options could be realized regularly.
The game executives played was not the game institutional investors and ayency theorists had envisioned when they promoted stock options, whch was of max~mizing the profitability of a company executives bnlh managed and held large stakes in. Instead, it was a game of maximizing profits from company stock sold as sfion as it could legally be sold. CEOs did not hold onto stock, whlch would have aligned their interests with those of shareholders. They sold stock as soon as they could manipulate its price upward, with the argument that diverwfication was more prudent than putting all of your eggs in one basket (Khurana. 2002) . Instead of aligning CEO and shareholder interests, the stock optloll craze produced irrational short-term exuberance.
Growth-by-aquisition had encoura9rd executive behavior that was sometimes irrational, but rarely illegd. CEO5 might acqulrt firms that would not increase overall profitability, but this was not against any laws. Beat-theanalysts encouraged behavior that was lnational and sometimes illegal. It encouragd legal means of altering profit statements, but illegal mwns as well.
This was the dynamic that led firms to a new corporate strategy. Now to the three groups that advocated for it. LYow did three groups of profess~onal managers, sitting outside of major corporations, so dramatically change I he coursc of America's largest tirms? The answer says a lot about the changing nature of power in the business elite. If the classical view of capitalisn~ was that factory vwners were enriched by the sweat of workers, extract~ng surplus xalue from the production process, what we see happening here 1s something quite different. The business-knowledge elite manipulates the behavior of large corporations. enriching themselves (money managerr and institut ionnl Investors. secun tles analysts and bankers, and corporate executives) b) skimming profits from the pension reserves of workers and from the investments of the lumpen bourgeoisie.
Hostile Takeover Firms
Hostile takeover firms dramatically reshaped large corporations in the late 19 70s and early 1980s by dismantling diversified conglomerates and selling off the parts, demonstrating that diversified firms had low stock prices that d~d a disservice to their shareholders. Executives at first despised them, but takeover specialists succeeded in making a business case for what they were doing -the!^ increased the value of the firn~s they took over by spinning off tangential busmess units. In a short period of time, they gave a bad name to diversification and focused corporate attention on stock price, because they only took over firms that were undervalued and that could be sold off, piece by piece, at a profit.
Before the increase of the shareholder value firm, there was of course a theory of why the diversified conglomerate was a good idea. Portfol~o theory, in economics, reinforced the idea that the modern firm should be run as an internal capital market, investing in promising sectors and spreading risk across different sorts of industries (Fligstein. 1990 ). The institutional economist Oliver W~ll~amwn (1 975) seconded this idea. arguing that conglomerates could acquire poorly performing firms and improve their profitability by managing them under financial accounting met hods. Meanwhile, the major consulting firms -McKrnsey. Arthur D. Little. The Boston Consulting Group -had developed technologies that simplified the management of diversified conglomerates. They proselyli7ed. and provided the tools for the strategy of diversification. By the end of the IY70s,45% of the Fortllne 500 had adopted these port folio planning techniques (Davis, Diek~nann 8 Tinsley, 1994, p. 554) .
The inflation of the 1970s, the invention of the "junk bond" and the leveraged buyout (LBO) , and Reagan's regulatory cha~lges all fueled the hostile takeover trend. First, the inflation of the 1970s left many firms with low book values. but managers were reluctant to increase the book value of assets because this would put pressure on their profit margins. Returns on assets looked better when assets were artificially low due to inflation, but the result uf not adjusting book values was that many f i r m s had low market valuations that made them takeover targets (Fl~gstein, 2001 ; Fligstein & Markowitz, 1993; Zorn, 2004) . Second, new finance tools such as high yield "junk" bonds and new acquisition strategies such as the LBO made hostile takeovers possible. Third, Reagan's regulalory stance helped takeover firms in two ways. On the one hand, Reagan relaxed restrictions spalnst mergers among competitors, and this allowed buyers of firms to sell off tangential business units to the most interested parties -the direct con~petitors of those units. On the other, the courts relaxed controls of hostile takeovers themselves (Davis et al., 1994, p. 554) .
The firm of Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts (KKR) showed how successful the strategy of buying up large conglomerates and selling off tangential and unprofitable businesses to increase the stock price could be. Beginning in 1976, they bought up over 40 companies and restructured them, including such behemoths as Beatrice Companies and RJR Nabisco. R.J. Reynolds and Nabisco had merged only in 1985, but in 1989 K K R bought the company out for close to $25 billion. and then its head office of a mere dozen professionals ran the company using financial controls (Useem, 1993, p. 35). They often sided with management in these buyouts, in the role of "white knight" against external hostile takeover firms. But the results of the "white knight" takeover and the hostile takeover were much the same: the diversified conglomerate was broken up and a streamlined firm (with improved stock market valuation) emerged.
Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsiey (1 994) provide several sorts of evidence of the effect of the hostile takeover movement on Fortune-500 companies.
First, they show that in the i980s, firms that were diversified were significantly more likely to be acquired (and presumably broken up) than firms that were not diversified but were otherwise similar. The new management model led people to try to acquire and restructure conglomerates. Second, they show that about 30°h of these corporations received some sort of takeover bid in the 1980s. In a comparable sample, we find that about 1 1 % of firms received hostile takeover bids in the 1980s -so about one-third of all takeover bids were hostile (Zorn, Dobbin, Dierkes & Kwok, 2004) . Every large American firm recognized the growing threat of hostile takeover. The phenomenon declined significantly toward the 1990s, partly because twothirds of large firms instituted takeover defenses such as the poison pill (Davis, 1991) . Many CEOs inoculated against takeover by dediversifying their firms themselves.
There is also good evidence that the takeover trend helped to put an end to further diversification. Davis and colleagues show that the lion's share of the acquisitions in the late 1980s was horizontal and vertical acquisitions. Diversifying acquisitions were now rare. In our sample of large publicly held firms, the median firm operated in three different industries in 1968, in five by 1983, and again in three by 1995. This despite the fact that the average firm was much larger, in terms of revenues and employment, by 1 995. Firms also became increasingly likely to acquire within their own industriesacquisitions of firms in related fields made up four-fifth of all acquisitic~ns in 1988, and less than nine-tenths in 2000 (Zorn et al., 2004) . A firm did not have to receive a hostile takeover bid to read the writing on the wall, and many CEOs restn~ctured to inoculate ~hemselves.
HostiIe takeover firms broke conglomerates up, demonstrating that the component parts could sometimes be sold for more than the previous market valuation -that the parts were greater r han the sum of the whole. These firms and their proxies argued forcefuliy that such break-ups were in the interest of investors, who reaped higher share prices. and ultimately benefited the economy 3 s a whole. As Michael Jensen wrote in the Harvard Business Review in 1983, critics ignore "the fundamental econonlic function that takeover activities qerve." Congress was alannrd at the wave of takeovers in the early 19XOs, but that alarm was snjsplaccd:
rn the corporatc takeover markfl, managers compete for the right 10 contrnl that is, Lo manage -coqrrate resources. Viewed in this way, the market for corporals control is an impuria~ii par1 of the managerial labor market ... After all, pote~~tlal chlet' executive officers do no1 simply leave their applications w t h personnel officerri. Their on-the-job performanrx is suhjecr ntri only to the normal inlertlal conlrol mechanisms or their orgst~izations but also rn the scrutiny of thc external markct Tor control (Jensen, 19 .54,
p. ! 10).
Jensen thus legitimized takeover activity as a mechanism for ousting poorly performing chief executives and giving control of their firms to those better suited to run them. In the end, takeover specialists convinced the world that what they did for a living. far from threatenme the corporation, was efficient. That it was in the interest of shareholders.
As takeover firms broke up conglomerates whose market valuations they judged to be too low, arguing that shareholders were the beneficiaries, executives became increasingly sensitive to the valuation of their firms by financial market constituents because their compensation was based increasingly on stock options and because neglecting stock price sometimes invited hostile takeover bids that left the CEO johless. Takeover firms and the LBO faded away because corporate executives took their lessons to heart, dediversifying and focusing on stock price themselves.
Takeover specialists made huge sums of money from takeovers. They succeeded in popularizing the value orien I ation, and legitimating their own activit~es, by arguing that they were not just slock speculators. They argued that they were promoting a new vision of how the firm should behave and ousting executives with an anllquated vision. The power of takeover specialists to reshape the American corporation thus came from their abiIity to frame their activity as in the interest of shareholders --as forcing executives to manage firms t o benefit their true owners. This rhetorical ploy worked, and it would be institutional investors and securities analysts who shaped the particular meaning that a value orientation would have, that of beating analysts' profit projections.
As a professional group, institutional investors saw themselves as advocates for the thousands of pension fund participants and mutual fund buyers they represented. As they themselves were paid for the performance of the funds they managed, it was in their interest to encourage firms to maximize stock price -this is what fattened their own paychecks. So they saw their interests and those of the individuals they represented as synonymous. Similar to hostile takeover firms, institutional investors encouraged executives to do what they could to maximize stock price. As il became widely helizved that diversified firms had artificially low stock prices. one of rhe strategies they promoted was dediversification. By focusing on stock price, encoursging firms to pay executives for stock price performance. and encouraging firn~s to spin off business unrelated to their main ac~ivilq, institutional investors reshaped corporate strategy.
Driven partly by the explosion of defined-contribution pension plans and the increasing popularity of mutual funds as a form of investment, and partly by the aping of the haby boom generation and the expansion of its pensloll holdings. institutional investors grew from minor players to the dominant _rroup uontrvlling the flow of money into the stock market (Swedberg. 2004 The conventional wisdom ca. 1980 was that if an investor did not like the way A firm war; managed. she could vote with her feet. moving her money elsewhere. In.;tttt~tiunal investors came to believe that it made more sense to retbrrn managetnent than to seil off stock. Family owners had been the main proponents of nIana3ement reform before this, but the family that heId a sigtlificant stake was becoming a rarity (Useem, 1996). Some HewlettPackard (HP) Family heirs fought tu prevent the HP merger with Compaq, for instance, but this role had become the exception. Now institutional investors with large chunks of stock in General Motors, for instance, preferred to lobby for management changes when stock price languished. Selling off at a low price cost shareholders dearly. and translated into smaller paychecks for institutional investors. They encouraged executives to pay more attention to stock price.
Inslitutional investors were vocal advocates for replacing the old executive compensatlon system, which amounted to pay-for-size because the highest salaries typically went to managers of the largest corporations, with pay-forperromance via stock options. They sometimes cited agency theory in economics. Michael Jensen, a finance professor at the University of Rochester who would later move to Harvard Business School and become a principal of the Monitor Group consultancy, was coauthor of the article often credited with popularizing agency theory in financial economics (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Writing in Harvard Business Review, Jensen (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) argued forcefully that major firms made the mistake of paying their executives bureaucrats. tying compensation to show in!: up for the job rather than to performing. Jensen and Murphy called for hoards of directors to require CEOs to be substantial shareholders, to link conlpensation to performance through stock options and bonuses. and to tire CEOs when they performed poorly. Boards had some trouble dernatlding that CEOs be major stockholders. for even if execlitjvcs exercised stock options to buy stock, they could turn right around and sell the stock. Boards also found it difficult to fire CEOs, partly because CEOs typically stafied boards with their cronies. Boards found jl easy to offer stock options on top of r e~l a r salary and bonuses, and so this i s the advice they most often took. As Rakesh Khurana (2002, p. 191) concludes: "Enormous grants of stock options to CEOs have been justified on the grounds that they link CEO pay to performance. Yet recent research has shown that one or the first actions that new CEOs typically take is to break this hnk by exercising their options (and selling their shares) as soon as possible."
The single most important change institutional investors brought about was the rise of stock options in executive compensation. As these investors came to be paid for the performance of their portfolios, they saw it as in their interest to make sure that executives of the companies they invested in were also paid for their stock performance. This helped to redirect CEO attention to stock price. and it encouraged CEOs to follow the current advice o i dediversifyirig to i tnprove transparency and value. The other change inst~tutional investors favored was the abandonment of the diversification model. One reason was thal it was their job to build diversified portfolios for the institutions they worked for, and they could do this hetter when firnls themselves had clear industr) identities. Building a divernfied portfolio out of firms that were the~nselves divrrs~ficd portfolios was a messy husioess. The other reason is that takeover firms had made clear to the world that diversified firms tended tu be undervalued. This may have been partly brcause institutional invedors did not favor hem, of course, maklng the prophesy that diversified firms were undervalued selffulfilling.
11 was not until 1990 that the theon, of why single-industry firms were better managed than mulll-industry firms was well articulated. Curecompetence theory was given 11s name in 1990 by C. K. Pralahad and Gary Hamel in the Harvard Business Review, in an article titled "The Core Competencies of the Firm.'' But managers such as Jack Welch at General Electric had since the early 1980s argued for a style of hands-on managemtnl and corporate focus that presaged the idea. even if Welch oversaw a diversified behemoth. As Michael Useem (1996, p. t 53) argues. "While diversification had been a hallmark of good management during the 1960s, shedding unrelated business had become the measure during the 1980s and 1990s." Institntional investor preference for single-industry firms translated into chanses in business strategy. Fortune-500 companies whose stock was held by institutional investors a1 the beginning of the 1980s were more likely than others 11) spin off unrelated businesses (1996, p. 
153).
Hostile takeover firms deconstruct ed diversitizd conglomerates and gave CEOs a reason to spin off unrelated businesses Ihemselves; to preclude takeovers that would depose the executive ream. They also focused executive attenlion on stock price. for takeover targets were undervalued firms. Institutional investors discouraged further diversification. for they saw ir as their job to create diversified portfolios. They also focused executive attention on stock price. prornotitlg stock options for executives to align executive interest with the interest o f shareholders and of inst~~utional investors themselves.
Like hostile takeover firm.; and institutional investors. securities analysts took actions that both discouraged diversification and focused CEO attention on financlal numbers. They also helped to establish the yardstick by which corporations were measured. meeting analysts' projections or "making the quarter."
The role of stock analysts in encouraging firms to put all of their eggs into one industry has been well documented in the studies of Ezra Zuckerman i 1999, 2000) . The conventional wisdom that shareholders demand that diverdfied firms dismantle misses key process. Analysts discouraged diversification because they specialized by industry. Multi-industry firm had fuzzy identities that made then1 difficult to analyze, and so analysts were less likely to cover conglomerates than single-industry firms of similar size.
Firms liked analyst coverage. because analysts could only make "buy" recommendations for the firn~s they actually followed. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, executives in diversified firms responded by re focusing: selling off unrelated product lines. they hoped to benefil from increased share prices (Zuckeman, 2000) . Zuckerman (1999) also shows that firms that were not covered by these industry special~sts suffer, in terms of share price, relative to thew peers. Firms with fewer an,?lysls following them had lower market valuations than otherwise similar firms. Their CEOs, now dependent on stock options for income, suffered as well.
Meanwhile, the analyst profession was booming. Our data d~o w that the typical industry leader was followed by eight analysts in the late 1970s ,md 18 by the early 1YWs (Zom et al., 2004) . With so many analysts to satisfy. more and more exwutivzs appointed chef financial officers to communicate with them and to m a k sure corporate reports would satisfy them. In 1975, 5% of the industry lwclers in our sample had CFOs. By 1995,80% had them (Zorn , 2 0 4 ) . 1n addition to promoting dediversification, dnalysts also transformed the obsession with stock price, which institutional investors had driven home, into an obsession with meeting analysts' profit projections. They did this by publishing profit projections for the firms they covered. The analyst project of inducing firms to pay more attention was fueled by the rise of high technology firms. Just when the number a f stock analysts was rising, high technology stock that defied co~iventional analysis flooded the market. Amazon, AOL, and the likes lost money every quarter, but they were clearly the firms of the future. How tr, judge whlch to invest in? As during the heady days of 19th-century railway expandon, prospects for future profitahi tity seemed more important I han current accounts. Institu t ivnal and individual investors could not always judge a firm by its profits, but did profits meet with expectations? As Harris Coliingwood wrote in the Harvard Business Review's June 2001 issue (p. 5); "There's a tyrant terrorizing nrarly e v e 7 public company in the United States -it is called the quarterly earnings report. I t dominates and distorts the decisions of executives. analysrs, investors. and auditors. Yet it says almost nothing about a business's health.
Hoiv did a single nutuhzr come to loom so large?" Journalist Joseph Nowra ( 1 998) notes that at Fidelity, the private institutional investment powerhouse, the Focus shifted from actual perfor~~lance In the late 1980s to beating analysts' forecasts in the late 1990s.
From timc to time. young F~delity hands would rush mil (CEO) Lynch'< oflice to (ell h~m some news about a company. They would cav things I~ke, "Company X just rcportcd a solid quarter-up 20%." Eleven years later, as I review my old notes, 1 am struck by the fact lhnl n o one <aid that Company X had "cxoeeded expect;+tions." Thcrc was no mention of conference calls, prc-announcements or whisper numbers Nor dtd I ever hear Lynch ask anyone -be it a company cvecut~ve or a "sell sidc" analv.;t on Wall Street -whether Company X war golng to "make the quarter" (Nowrd. 1998) Fortune magazine suggests thal the emergence of firms making available consensus forecast data, based on the averages of these profit projections.
focused executive attention on analyst forecasts and corporate strategy on meeting those forecasts:
Executives of pubhc companies have always strived to IIVC up to ~nkestors' expectations. and keeping earnlnps nslng smoothly and prcdictahly has lone beer1 seen as the surest way lo do that. But il's only in the past decade, with thc nse to prominence of thc consensuq earnings estimates mtnpiled first in the early 1970s by I/B/E/S (lt15lilu11ona.l Brokers Estimate Sysrcm) and now also by cumpctitclrs Zacks, First Call, and Nelson's. h a t those expectations have becomc so e x p l~a i . Possibly as a result, cvmgan~cs sre dome a better lob of hitting their targels: For an unprecedented 16 conmullve quartc:s, more S&P 500 companies heat the cnnsrnaus eiimings estimates than missed them (Fox. 1997) Firms were, by their own accounts, relatively insulated from investor preferences m the 1960s and 1970s. Individual investors rare11 had the time to scrutinize the firnis they invested in, but with t h e proliferation of stock analysts and publications covering their projections, investors had more information. albeit oft en meaningless information. to look at. With stock analysts and institutional investors working full time to evaluate companies, execurives became more and more sensitive to investor preferences -or more precisely, to the preferences of their proxies, institutional investors.
With this increase in attenlion came more volatilily in stock price. Stock price began to move more frequently In tandem with quarterly earnings reports and w~t h analysts' buy and sell recommendations. Since stock options nom tied e x e c u t i v e compensation to stock price. which hinged on meeting analyst expectations, meeting targets became a pre-occupation among corporate executikes. Executives and CFOs responded by trying to game the numbers. CFOs held confere~~ce calls nnd reported updates about sales and costs much more frequent1 y, trying to ensure accurate analyst forecasts. They also began to issue earnings pre-announcements to bring analysts' forecasts inlo line with their own forecasts. Among the firms we studied, the first did this in the early 1990s: and by 2000 some 5Ooh were doing it. Firms also became more successfu1 at "making their earnings," or meeting analyst forecasts. Whereas no more than half of firms met analyst expectations in the 1980s and early 1990s, by the late 1990s 70?/b of the firms we studied were meeting forecasts. Of course, the rapid increase in earnings restatements makes clzar how some firms did this -where managing analysts failed. CFOs used legal and illegal means of deception.
Earning management can be seen in other sta~lstics ar well. Using data on thousands of quarterly reports between 1974 and 1996 , Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999 show that firms are significantly more iikely to report earnings 1 har exact ly match analysts predictions than they are lu report earnings that overshoot or undershoot by even 3 penny. And when earnings are off, firms are much more likely to sltghtly overshoot than to sijghtly undershoot. This pattern could only appear because managers mailage earnings in myriad ways. Collinpwovd argues that CEOs and CFOs used every imaginable accounting trick lo "make the quarter." Executives at Sunbeam reported as current earninps, expected future earnings on sales of barbecues at Wal-Mart and Sears. The stock crashed when word got out. Executives at SmithKlein Beecham's venture capital pr oup losl millions in potential pru tits when their bosses refused to sell a biotechnology unit at the peak of the biotech market, for fear of reporting profits dramatically higher than analysts were projecting. Biotech stock indeed tanked, erasing the paper profit (Collingwuod, 100 1 1.
Hence. the job of CFO came to involve not only public relations, but also the development aT ac-countlng gimmicks that would allow firms to meet analysts' expectations. The accounting specialist gave way to the spin doctor. As Daniel Altman wrote in the Nexv York Tinies in April of 2002. the job of CFO had changed. "Once upon a tlrtie. witldow-dressing was not in the job description. 'The CFO hack 20, 30 years ago generally came out of the accounting profession,' said Karl M . von der Heyden, former chief financial officer of both PepsiCo and RJR Nabisco. Thry were glorified controllers.. . 'In the 90'5, the CFO more and more became the partner of the CEO in many good companies,' Mr. von der Heyden said" (Altman, 2002) . The job became one of managins earnings. Thus the role of the corporate head of finance had charlged dramatically.
The vice president of finance had been upgraded from back office accountant to part of the lop mal~agctnznt troika, with the CEO and COO. The ideal CFO was the CEO's right hand man, with the accounting savvy to produce attractive numbers and the people skills to keep institutional investors and analysts content.
CONCLUSION: THE MYTH OF REFORM
Understanding power relations is not as straightforward urtder modern capi~alism as it would seem to have been in the early days of industrialization in Manchester and Lowell. Karl Marx saw factory girls working long hours under onerous conditions, and facton; owners reaping the lion's share of the profits. The control of capital was what separated one group from the other. Ownership of cap~tal is n o longer all that matters. Knowledge professionals in business specialties are ascendant, and the owners of capital are more likely to be wilrkers themselves, investing through pension funds.
IncreasingIy. power depends on the capacity of one group of business experts to alter the incentives of another. and on the capacity of one group to define the interests of another (Roy, 1997) . What takeover specialists. institutional investors, and securities analysts managed to d o was to change the perceived interests of both corporate executives and shareholders. Executives were now convinced ttrat it is in their interest to manage share price. Stock owners were now convinced that they were hettrr off after hostile t akeovzrs (despite the Fdct that takeover specialists became millionaires) and that they were better off with fims managing earnings.
They did this not exactly with malice aforethought, in part because these groups of business experts could not have guessed exactly where all of these changes would lead, and in part because they brainwashed not only CEOs and shareholders. but themseIvzs. As in any good contact game. these groups hail to make the case compellingly and genuinely that the course they proposzd was really in everyone's interest. They conned themselves first and ioremost. Takeover specialists convinced themsrlves that they were ousting inept CEOs. Institutional investors convinced themselves that CEOs should be paid for performance. Analysts convinced themselves that forecasts were il better metric for judging stock price than current profits. This is not to say that the new approach to management is not superior to the old approach. By some measures it is most certainly superior. hut one should be skeptical of claims that making the company's focus the management of earnings is in the inierest of shareholders. One should as well be skeptical of the claim that focused firms are inherently more valuable than diversified hnns -, valuations are endogenous to the sysiem. which is to say that if securities analysts had come to spec~alize by company size, or region, ur anything other than industry, they might have Fdvored conglomerates and single-industry firms m~ght have been undervalued.
For the myth of shareholder value to take hold, three different professional groups had to construct their own interests. and the interests of zxecutives and shareholders. in ways that favored a dramatic change in firm strategy. First, hostile takeover firms broke conglomerates up, arguing that t h t component parts could sometimes be sold for more than the price of the firm -that the parts were greater than the sum of rhe whole. They insisted that this ac~ivity was in the in~erest of investors, who reaped higher share prices, and that il ultimately benefited the economy as a whale by creating an efficient market for securities. They succeeded in conv~ncing the world that what was originally seen as rank speculation in fact enhanced the economy's efficiency. Second. institutional investors, convolli ng ever-larger blocks of corporate stock, saw i t as their job -not the firm's job -to build balanced portfojios. They saw executives focused on growth rather than stock price, and succeeded in changing the way executives were paid to focus I heir attention on stock price. Third, securir ies analysts specialized by ind u s~ ry, neglecting diversified fir~ns. They argued that for themselves, and fur the individual investor, it was impossible to evaluate a huge conglomerate operating in six different sectors. This encouraged diversified firms eager to attract coverage by industry specialisis to divest unrelated business segments. They also collectively invented a new metric of corporate success, replacing simple profilability with meeting analyst forecasts of profitability.
This change set off a search for accounting gimmicks that would allow firms lo report the kinds of numbers analysts liked to see. These three groups had important accomplices. of course. The big accounting firms vetled the profit reports of major corporarions and peddled accounting gimmicks that wourd help them to "make the quarter." Securities analysts working for financial institutions that managed initial public offerings (IPOsl of upstarts recommended that ~nvestnrs buy stock in those very same upstarts (Swedberg, 2004) . Many found ways to make out in the new world of shareholder value.
Of course, the shareholder value strategy coincided with a remarkable run-up in share prices, and it no doubt played a part. The bubble did burst, destroying much of the value that had been created. Moreover, the earnlngs management strategy that became the hallmark of shareholder value boomeranged on many firms. CFO magazine quotes none other than Michael Jensen, the tarly proponent of pay-for-performance, on the disasters associated with earnings management. As a result of compnsation packages that encourage earnings management, "We've seen the ruination of many firms" (Fink, 2004) .
If paying CEOs a fixed salary and a small bonus every year failed to resolve the agenc) problems inherent in hiring managers to run companies they do not own, the use of stock options and other "long term incentives" did not resolve the problems either. lt has changed the specifics of the probiem. Executives focus irrationally o n ~rlanaging earnings, rather than on new corporate conquests.
Much-touted regulatory changes such as the Sarbanesaxley A prevent some binds of executive malfeasance, but do nothins to really alter the dynamic of the new system that these groups put into place. The) may make it marginally harder Tor rnecutivcu to game the profit reporting system, but only until someone comes lip w~t h tt11.1re subtle accounting maneuvers that can pass, through new regulatory roadblocks. 
